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This paper investigates and analyzes the intraday and daily determinants of bid‐ask spreads 
(BASs) in the foreign exchange futures (FXF) market. It is found that the number of 
transactions and the volatility of FXF prices are the major determinants. The number of 
transactions is negatively related to the BAS, whereas volatility in general is positively 
related to it. The study also finds that there are economies of scale in trading FXF contracts. 
The intraday BAS follows a U‐shaped pattern, and they tend to be higher on Mondays and 
Tuesdays than on other days of the week. Higher spreads at the beginning and end of a 
trading day are consistent with the presence of adverse selection and the avoidance of the 
possibility of carrying undesirable inventory overnight, respectively. Seasonal differences in 
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INTRODUCTION
This article examines the determinants of bid-ask spreads (BAS) in the
foreign exchange futures (FXF) market using the bid-ask spread estimator
advanced by Chu, Ding, and Pyun (CDP, 1996). Many previous studies
concerning bid-ask spreads have focused their analyses on the determi-
nants, components, and behavior of BASs in the equity markets (see, for
example, George, Kaul, and Nimalendran, 1991; McInish and Wood,
1992; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Glosten, 1987; Glosten and Harris,
1988; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Haller and Stoll, 1989; and Stoll, 1989,
among others). A few researchers have examined BASs in the financial
futures market (for example, Wang, Michalski, Jordon, & Moriarty, 1994;
Ma, Peterson, & Sears, 1992; and Laux & Senchack, 1992). These studies
deal mainly with the estimation and intraday behavior of the BAS.
There are some studies that analyze the BASs in the foreign exchange
spot market (Overturf, 1982; Boothe, 1988; Glassman, 1987; Fieleke,
1975; Allen, 1977; and Bossaerts & Hillion, 1991). But hardly any study
has been done to examine the determinants of BASs in the FXF market.
The most closely related research is that by Harvey and Huang (1991),
who study the volatility in the FXF market. Essentially, they find that
increases in price volatility coincide with announcements of macroeco-
nomic news and recognize that the variance is affected by the BAS.
The bid-ask spread represents a major component of a trader’s trans-
action cost. In an order-driven market, such as in the futures market of
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), the spread can only be im-
plied. There are no specific quotes by official market makers. It is there-
fore imperative, in such a market, for a serious trader to have an under-
standing of the various factors that can have a significant impact on the
BAS. A trader in the FXF market would want to know what drives the
spread: (i) what is the impact of trading activity and price volatility on the
BAS; (ii) whether there are any macroeconomic variables that can explain
the size of the spread; and (iii) whether there is a particular period within
the trading day, week, or contract month that represents higher or lower
spreads and, hence, higher or lower transaction costs. The effect of the
various factors on BASs in the FXF market may not necessarily be the
same as those that drive the spreads in the foreign exchange spot market.
Thus it is important for traders in the FXF market to appreciate the un-
derlying factors that can contribute to their transaction costs and the
timing of their transactions.
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TRADING ON THE CHICAGO MERCANTILE
EXCHANGE AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL
DETAILS
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) trades futures contracts in six
currencies, including the deutsche mark (DM) and Japanese yen (JY)
contracts. The trading hours are from 7:20 am to 2:00 pm daily. A standard
delivery schedule of March, June, September, and December is followed.
Trading on the floor is through a system of open outcry where bid and
offer prices are made known verbally in a trading pit. The actual trading
of futures contracts on the exchange floor is done by floor traders or floor
brokers, who are members of the exchange. Floor traders are those who
trade for their own account, whereas floor brokers trade on behalf of their
brokerage firm or for their firm’s customers. Both floor traders and bro-
kers are granted equal access to the market. However, brokers are re-
quired to trade for their customers before trading for their own account.
In the trading process, orders to buy or sell futures are sent to a
member firm’s representative on the trading floor through the telephone
or a computerized order-entry system. The orders are then time-stamped
and taken to the trading pit by an appointed runner. The floor broker,
who handles a firm’s trades in a specific contract or delivery month, takes
responsibility for executing the order. All bids and offers must be an-
nounced through open outcry. Trading in a particular contract can only
take place in a designated trading pit and within the officially established
trading times. When an order is executed, it is again time-stamped, to-
gether with its price and trade size. Confirmation of the transaction is
then transmitted to the firm’s originating office and the customer. At the
same time, a pit observer records the price of the trade for immediate
entry into the CME’s computerized price-reporting system for immediate
transmission of the information to market participants globally.
In FXF markets, there are no official market makers such as the
dealer-specialists of organized stock markets. Scalpers provide liquidity
by quoting bid and ask prices against which market orders can be exe-
cuted. This is as close as it can get to certain equity markets (such as the
NYSE), where specialists make the market by buying and selling from
their own inventory—but fundamentally different from a screen-based
computerized market (such as in Singapore and Malaysia), where no des-
ignated market makers exist and transactions occur only when buy and
ask orders match. In the screen-based equity markets, all trades are ef-
fected through computer matching of buy and sell quotes by strict price
and time priority, and all transactions occur at posted prices. This means
that there can be no difference between posted and effective spreads.
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On the NYSE, also, the opening procedure is different from that of
the futures market. The NYSE procedure involves a price discovery pro-
cess in which the market is called to determine the best price that will
effect the greatest number of transactions. In contrast, transaction prices
in the futures market are determined through an open outcry process of
bid and ask quotes on the trading floor. This means that even a pseudo-
market maker such as the scalper does not simultaneously reveal both
bid and ask quotes even though he may stand ready to buy from or sell
to the market. This is very different from the specialist system of the
NYSE, wherein the market makers (specialists) provide immediacy to the
market by standing ready to buy and sell through quoting their bid and
ask prices simultaneously. Because of the way prices are quoted, there
can be some fundamental differences in the way bid-ask spreads are de-
termined in the futures and equity markets. The implicit BASs of the
futures contracts are not directly observable, but can be estimated using
the covariance of price changes. These will be discussed later in this
article.
FXF contracts trade primarily on the International Monetary Market
(IMM) of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) with deutsche mark
(DM) and Japanese yen (JY) futures contracts being the most actively
traded of all currency contracts. FXF contracts also trade on the London
International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) and the smaller Sin-
gapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX), the Philadelphia
Board of Trade, and some South American exchanges. However, interest
on the LIFFE tapered off and trading was suspended in 1990. The CME
had a mutual offset arrangement with the Singapore International Mon-
etary Exchange (SIMEX) during 1990 (it was in operation from 1984 to
1995), whereby traders on the CME can offset their positions on the
SIMEX without incurring any additional transaction costs. Thus, con-
ceivably, a trader on the CME can react to new information and offet his
position on the SIMEX during Chicago’s closing hours.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
In the equity market, McInish and Wood (1992) show that intraday BASs
depend negatively on the level of activity and market competition, and
positively on the level of risk and information. In the foreign exchange
market, Boothe (1988) finds that different measures of risk and trans-
actions volume have an impact on BASs. Specifically, he provides evi-
dence for a positive relationship between the level of uncertainty regard-
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ing future prices and BASs. The relationship between trading volume and
BASs is found to be negative.
In the futures market, Ma, Peterson, and Sears (1992) examine vari-
ous measures of BASs on different futures contracts and find that spread
levels are significantly higher at the beginning and end of a trading ses-
sion. They provide the explanation of higher levels of trading noise and
information uncertainty during those periods. However, these phenom-
ena can be caused by infrequent trading.
Wang, Michalski, Jordan, and Moriarty (1994) investigate the deter-
minants of the bid-ask spread and price volatility of S&P 500 index fu-
tures that are traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. They find that
the major factors affecting BASs are the price risk, trade volume, and
market competition. They also find a U-shaped pattern in BASs. However,
they realize that this pattern is not significant after adjusting for the ef-
fects of price volatility, transaction volume, and market competition.
I utilize the findings in the equity and foreign exchange markets to
investigate the forces driving BASs in the FXF market. Activity measures
usually encompass two main components—the number of transactions
and the trading volume per transaction. As trading activity increases, the
market becomes more liquid. Scalpers in the FXF market provide liquidity
by quoting bid and ask prices against which market orders can be exe-
cuted. Garbade and Silber (1979) find that the actions of scalpers reduce
the volatility of price movements. Hence, an increase in the number of
transactions and trading volume can lead to scale economies, resulting
in lower BASs. However, Easley and O’Hara (1987), Glosten (1989), and
Kyle (1985) suggest that adverse selection should increase with order size.
Similarly, according to inventory models of the BAS, order processing
costs also increase with trade size. Thus an increase in BASs due to both
adverse selection and order processing costs should be due to an increase
in the order size. But Haller and Stoll (1989) find an inverse relationship
between BASs and trading volume in the German auction equity market.
Copeland and Galai (1983) maintain that market activity is a negative
function of BASs. Based on the results of previous studies, I do not expect
to see any significant difference, if any, in the way trading activity affects
the BAS among the equity, spot foreign exchange, and futures markets.
The following hypothesis is therefore investigated.
Hypothesis 1: BASs in the FXF market are negatively related to trading
activity.
McInish and Wood (1992) use a transformed ratio of the number of
shares traded on regional exchanges to the number of shares traded on
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the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to establish an inverse relationship
between BASs and the level of competition. In the FXF market, contracts
trade primarily on the International Monetary Market (IMM) of the CME
with deutsche mark (DM) and Japanese yen (JY) futures contracts being
the most actively traded. Competition from other exchanges is slight and
any effects from the competition should be minimal. Consequently, this
study does not attempt to establish such a relationship in the FXF market.
The uncertainty regarding future exchange rates subjects dealers to
the risk of holding onto a contract. There are a number of possible mea-
sures of risk in the FXF market, such as those investigated by Fieleke
(1975) and Overturf (1982). Overturf finds a positive BAS relation to
price volatility measured by its standard deviations, whereas Fieleke re-
ports a positive relationship between the rate of change in the exchange
rate and the cost of transacting in the foreign exchange market. Overturf
further suggests that the uncertainty regarding the rate of change in ex-
change rates tends to widen the BAS. In the FXF market, BASs are not
directly observable but can be estimated using the covariance of price
changes. Wang et al. (1994) demonstrate that OLS estimates of the BAS
equation are inconsistent if the standard deviation of transaction price
changes is found in the regression. Thus, in order to avoid a misspecifi-
cation of the BAS regression model [such as eq. (3)], a measure of vola-
tility other than the standard deviation, which is related to the covariance,
should be applied.
Garman and Klass (1980) provide a volatility measure that does not
contain the standard deviation but rather takes into account the open,
high, low, and closing prices of each time period. Their estimator has
been found to be more efficient than the traditional close-to-close esti-
mators. The specification of the Garman-Klass estimator is detailed later
in this article. In line with prior expectations, the following hypothesis is
anticipated to hold.
Hypothesis 2: The volatility of FXF prices has a direct relationship with
the BAS.
The presence of asymmetric information exposes a trader to the
problem of adverse selection. The trader expects a loss, a priori, due to
uninformed trading. Copeland and Galai (1983) show that, all else being
equal, informational uncertainty is positively related to the BAS. They
report that the BAS is a positive function of the price level and the return
variance. If high price levels result from informed trading, then the re-
lationship between price levels and BASs should be positive. In most
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empirical studies of BASs in the stock markets, a positive price–BAS
relation has been found (for example, Demsetz, 1968; Benston & Hag-
erman, 1974; Stoll, 1976; and Copeland & Galai, 1983). These studies
generally attribute their findings of large dealer spreads to the risk of
adverse selection or uninformed trading. However, McInish and Wood
(1992) find a negative BAS–price relationship. They ascribe their finding
to the presence of economies of scale in trading. When prices are high,
the dollar volume of transactions rises. This leads to a lowering of dealers’
required BAS to cover their costs.
In FXF markets, however, there are no official market makers such
as the dealer-specialists of organized stock markets. Therefore, the rela-
tionship between price levels and BASs, if any, may not be obvious. A
positive BAS-price relationship supports an asymmetric information hy-
pothesis, whereas a negative relationship lends support to the presence
of scale economies in trading in the FXF market. Hence this study ex-
amines the information conveyed through price levels in the framework
of the FXF market. The following null hypothesis is examined.
Hypothesis 3: There is no relationship between BASs in the FXF market
and price levels.
This article further postulates that there are intraday, weekday, and
seasonal patterns in the BAS, reflecting the changing underlying struc-
ture of the market. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) suggest that trades will
be concentrated during certain times of the day. In particular, discretion-
ary liquidity traders are thought to concentrate their trades during the
periods near the opening and closing of the market. McInish and Wood
(1992) report a reversed J-shaped pattern in intraday BASs that is in-
versely related to trading activity. This means that BASs are higher at the
beginning and end of a trading day than the rest of the day. In addition,
they find that weekday patterns, though mostly significant, are weaker
than intraday patterns. Weekday patterns are also found to be unstable
over time. In the FXF market, traders are possibly faced with a greater
degree of the adverse selection problem at the start of a trading day than
the rest of the day. There is also an increase in the likelihood of carrying
undesirable inventory overnight toward the end of the trading day. Hence
spreads are expected to be higher at the beginning and end of a trading
day.
Bossaerts and Hillion (1991) have developed an asymmetric infor-
mation model of BASs in the foreign exchange market and they document
evidence of asymmetric information for all days of the week. However,
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spreads on Fridays are found to be more pronounced. Information asym-
metry is thought to be accompanied by an increase in the BAS. Because
governments usually reveal their intention to intervene in the currency
market during weekends when the foreign exchange markets are closed,
BASs may be expected to increase on Fridays. This may be explained by
the increased uncertainty from the possibility of having informed traders
transact on the Friday before the government’s announcement. McInish
and Wood (1992) also present evidence of larger spreads on Fridays in
the equity market. Moreover, because futures contracts can have different
delivery dates, a seasonal pattern that reflects the various maturities is
also expected and is investigated. This article represents one of the first
to study the existence of a maturity pattern.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
The study uses the time-stamped transaction-by-transaction data of the
deutsche mark (DM) and Japanese yen (JY) futures contracts that are
traded on the International Monetary Market of the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME) for the year 1990. Time series of transaction prices and
price changes for the March, June, September, and December delivery
dates of each FXF are constructed. Close-to-open (that is, overnight,
weekend, and holiday) price changes, from the market’s closing time to
the its next opening session, and trades after the market’s official closing
time are excluded from the data. In order to avoid a possible maturity
effect and the necessity to adjust for a time-varying volatility in price
changes (Laux & Senchack, 1994), observations are collected for each
contract until two weeks prior to its delivery date. Data for the March
contract begin 2 January; for the June contract, 8 March; for the Septem-
ber contract, 7 June; and for the December contract, 6 September. The
series of data are then chronologically appended to each other to form a
long time series of prices and price changes for 1990. The total number
of price change observations for the DM futures over the four contract
dates is 294,502; for the JY futures, it is 281,980.
Deutsche mark and Japanese yen futures prices are selected for this
study for two main reasons: (i) They are the two most actively traded
currency futures contracts on the CME that are chosen in order to avoid
a possible bias caused by infrequent trading as pointed out by Ma et al.
(1992); (ii) the BAS estimator used in this study follows that advanced
by Chu, Ding, and Pyun (CDP, 1996) and it is judicious to use a similar
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data set as that employed by CDP in the development of their model. In
the current analysis, as in CDP, the trading period from 7:20 am to 2:00
pm within each trading day is divided into thirteen time intervals: The
first interval has 40 minutes, whereas the remaining twelve intervals con-
sist of 30 minutes each for a total of 400 minutes in each trading day.
The CDP Estimator for Bid-Ask Spreads
The CDP spread estimator shown in eq. (1) considers the intraday Mar-
kovian bid-ask bounce process, which leads to a desirable equilibrium
condition of reaching a bid or an ask transaction type with equal chances.
Based upon a second-order Markov process, the derived estimator is
shown to be a more generalized estimator of BASs than in previous stud-
ies, such as those of Roll (1984) and Choi, Salandro, and Shastri (1988).
It considers the conditional probability of a subsequent transaction’s be-
ing the same type as that of the current transaction (d), and the condi-
tional probability of the next transaction’s being the same as the current
type but different from the previous type (a). CDP’s results show that the
average implied BAS is about $10, which is less than the value of one
tick size of $12.50. The small BAS reveals the low trading cost and high
operational efficiency in the FXF market.
Methodology
Various models have been advanced for the estimation of the BAS and
its components (for example, Roll, 1984; Choi, Salandro, & Shastri,
1988; George, Kaul, & Nimalendran, 1991; Laux & Senchack, 1994; and
Chu, Ding, & Pyun, 1996). Because BASs are not directly observable in
the FXF market, they need to be estimated first. The model derived by
Chu, Ding, and Pyun (1996) is used for this purpose. The CDP model
builds on both the Roll (1984) and Choi, Salandro, and Shastri (1988)
models and is intended to be an improvement over the two models. CDP
have shown that these two previous models are a special case of their
new model. As shown by Laux and Senchack (1992), Roll’s estimator is
more suited for futures prices, because it mainly measures order pro-
cessing costs that form the bulk of the transaction costs in the futures
market where adverse selection problems are less pronounced. It follows,
therefore, that BAS estimators that are Roll-based are more applicable to
the futures market rather than the equity market.
The approach of George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) is largely
applicable to equity prices where the components of the BAS are esti-
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mated separately. Laux and Senchack (1992) provide an alternative esti-
mate for the BAS of currency futures in a heteroskedastic market in which
more weight is assigned to observations in periods of light trading. The
CDP model, however, assumes a second-order Markov process to derive
a more general BAS estimator that is Roll-based but has less restrictive
assumptions than Roll’s estimator. It utilizes only the transaction price
data to estimate BASs and is specified as:
1Cov(Dp , Dp )t t`1s 4 (1)! (1 1 d)(1 1 a)
where s is the implied BAS; Dpt is the price change at time t; Cov refers
to the covariance between two consecutive price changes; d is the con-
ditional probability that the next transaction type (bid or ask) is the same
as the current transaction type; and a is the conditional probability that
the next transaction type is the same as the current type but different
from the previous type. Eq. (1) has been derived using a second-order
Markov chain transition matrix model where a and d are maximum like-
lihood estimates. If a 4 d, eq. (1) reduces to the Choi, Salandro, and
Shastri (1988) model. If a 4 d 4 0.5, it reduces to Roll’s (1984) model.
Thus, eq. (1) is a more generalized BAS estimator and both the Roll and
Choi et al. estimators are special cases of the CDP model.
The implied BASs are first estimated for each time interval and trad-
ing day by the CDP method.1 In order to ascertain the determinants of
the BAS, the implied spread is regressed against variables that represent
the level of activity, risk, information, and interest rate differential, to-
gether with three sets of dummy variables (D1, D2, D3) that serve to
measure intraday, weekday, and seasonal effects, respectively. The intra-
day and weekday effects are readily understood. The seasonal effects are
those that exhibit differences in spreads for the different delivery months
in a year. It should be pointed out that spread values, rather than per-
centages spreads (as in McInish & Wood, 1992), are measured in this
study for two reasons. First, the results where the spread value, rather
than the relative spread, is used as the dependent variable would convince
that the significance of the regression coefficients is not spurious. Sec-
1It should be noted that the CDP estimator is Roll (1984) based and utilizes the covariance of price
changes in each time interval of a trading day. There are, however, some intervals where the covar-
iance is positive, rendering it impossible to estimate a BAS for those intervals. If this occurs, then
observations for the affected intervals will not be included in the analysis. The author recognizes that
the exclusion of data in this manner is a fundamental weakness of all Roll-based spread estimators.
But, in this study, no more than a third of the observations have been excluded in any time interval.
In Roll’s study, however, his sample included up to a 51% occurrence rate of positive covariances.
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ond, unlike McInish and Wood’s study, no averaging of the spreads is
required. The regression for each contract is a time series one and there
is no motivation to measure relative spreads.
Because data for the trading volume per transaction are not available,
activity levels can only be measured by the number of transactions
(NTRANS) in each time interval t and trading day d together with the
trading volume per day. The variable NTRANS therefore serves as a proxy
measure for intraday activity levels. Differential risk over the thirteen time
intervals in each day are captured through the Garman-Klass (1980) vol-
atility measure (GK) in each time interval. The GK estimator is specified
as
2 2GK 4 0.511(a ` b) 1 0.019[x(a 1 b) ` 2ab] 1 0.383x (2)
where x 4 ln(close/open); a 4 ln(high/open); and b 4 1ln(low/open).
It is recognized that the GK estimator is susceptible to the effects of
outliers. To check for the possible existence of outliers, the basic statistics
in each time interval are examined for any inconsistencies and the trans-
action prices are visually inspected to identify any unusual prices. This
procedure resulted in the elimination of one observation that was pecu-
liarly large in the JY December contract on October 5, 1990.2
Information effects are evaluated by a price dummy variable
(PRDUM) in each time interval.3 The median transaction price is first
identified from the entire time series. The average price within each in-
terval is then computed and compared to the overall median price. If the
average price is greater than the median price, then the variable PRDUM
is assigned a value of one. Otherwise, a value of zero is assigned.
The empirical analysis is performed through the use of a regression
model. The model, which is an interval analysis of transaction prices, is
specified as
s 4 b ` b NTRANS ` b NGK ` b PRDUMt,d 0 1 t,d 2 t,d 3 t,d
15 19 22
` b D1 ` b D2 ` b D3 ` e (3)o i i,t,d o i i,t,d o i i,t,d t,d
i44 i416 i420
where st,d is the interval BAS; NTRANS is the number of transactions in
2Caution was taken not to arbitrarily eliminate legitimate large price change observations, because,
other than the one already eliminated, the next “big” price change has many occurrences and they
cannot be prudently regarded as outliers.
3Although the price level, rather than a price dummy, may generally provide more information, the
regression with the dummy shows a stronger relationship with the BAS, and only the results con-
taining the dummy variable are reported here. Moreover, the intention is to find out if there is a
BAS-price relationship, rather than the magnitude of such a relationship.
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TABLE I







Time Interval DMa JYb DM JY DM JY
1. 7:20–8:00 12.89 12.27 3.68 3.71 95 87
2. 8:00–8:30 11.14 11.88 3.91 4.31 92 81
3. 8:30–9:00 10.62 10.85 3.78 4.08 87 79
4. 9:00–9:30 10.35 10.26 3.91 4.00 82 72
5. 9:30–10:00 9.35 9.82 3.40 3.96 81 69
6. 10:00–10:30 9.19 9.85 3.52 4.03 79 72
7. 10:30–11:00 8.61 9.83 3.65 3.78 77 68
8. 11:00–11:30 9.31 9.85 3.65 4.82 83 74
9. 11:30–12:00 9.96 10.29 3.73 4.31 84 69
10. 12:00–12.30 9.78 10.84 3.82 4.66 77 72
11. 12:30–13:00 10.10 10.52 3.88 4.20 78 70
12. 13:00–13:30 10.77 10.23 3.82 4.18 83 76
13. 13:30–14:00 12.87 12.32 3.78 4.36 92 89
Notes: BASs for each time interval and trading day over the four delivery dates are computed for those intervals where a
negative covariance in price changes exist. Positive covariances are ignored. BASs are then averaged across all days for
each time interval to obtain the mean BAS and the standard deviation for that interval. The percentage of days with a
negative covariance of price changes is reported in the last two columns. There are 294,502 price change observations
for DM futures and 281,980 price change observations for JY futures.
aDeutsche mark futures contracts. Each contract trades for DM125,000.
bJapanese yen futures contracts. Each contract trades for ¥12.5 million.
the time interval; NGK is 10,000 times the value of GK; PRDUM is the
price dummy described above; D1, D2, and D3 capture the intraday,
weekday, and seasonal effects, respectively; and et,d is a random error
term.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Results are presented for the intraday analysis for each of the DM and
JY contracts. A pooled data analysis of both contracts was also done but
the results are not reported here. Overall, the findings from the pooled
analysis support the individual analysis.
Utilizing the 294,502 price change observations of the DM contracts
and the 281,980 price change observations of the JY contracts, the max-
imum likelihood estimates of a and d are found to be 0.4447 and 0.4372,
respectively, for the DM contract; and 0.4941 and 0.4748, respectively,
for the JY contract. Substituting the values of these estimates into eq. (1)
yields the average intraday BASs and their standard deviations reported
in Table I. It should be pointed out that, whereas the values of a and d
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for the JY contracts are close to 0.5 [which could justify simply using the
Roll (1984) model], the corresponding values for the DM contracts de-
viate sufficiently from 0.5 to support the use of the CDP model in esti-
mating bid-ask spreads. Applying Roll’s model would have over estimated
the size of the spread. The estimated spreads shown in Table I are largely
within one tick size of $12.50 except during the first and last time interval
of DM trading. This is consistent with efficient estimators of the BAS.
Although it is observed that the BAS for both contracts is higher
during the first 40 minutes and last 30 minutes of trading, the corre-
sponding volatility, as measured by their daily standard deviation in each
time interval, does not reveal any particular pattern. However, it is inter-
esting to see that the BASs of the JY contracts are, in general, more
volatile than those of the DM contracts. The last two columns of Table I
report the percentage of negative covariances in each time interval. It is
noted that the lowest value for the DM contract is 77%, whereas that for
the JY contract is 68%. These figures provide a sense for the validity of
using eq. (1) in estimating the implied BASs.
The regression model of eq. (3) is run to examine the determinants
of intraday BASs in the FXF market. Results of this regression are pre-
sented in Table II. The strength of this regression is supported by the F-
statistics of 58.44 for the DM contracts and 38.17 for the JY contracts.
These values are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The adjusted
R-squares of 0.3296 for the DM and 0.2616 for the JY show that, re-
spectively, 32.96% and 26.16% of the variation in intraday BASs are ex-
plained by the independent variables.
As expected, the level of trading activity, as measured by the variable
NTRANS, is significantly negative at the 0.01 level for both the DM and
JY contracts. The result confirms Hypothesis 1 that the number of trans-
actions in an intraday time interval is negatively related to the size of the
BASs in the interval. One inference from this result is that there are
economies of scale in trading. The interval risk in FXF prices has been
found to be directly related to the intraday BAS, confirming Hypothesis
2. This is supported by the strong coefficients of the Garman-Klass vol-
atility measure (NGK) that are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
These results are consistent with findings from the existing microstruc-
ture literature that show a positive relationship between risk and the size
of spreads.
The price dummy variable (PRDUM), on the other hand, is found
to be negatively significant at the 0.01 level for both contracts. This find-
ing dominates the presence of any asymmetric information trading. It is
therefore consistent with the presence of trading economies in the FXF
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TABLE II
Results for the Regression of Interval Bid-Ask Spreads per Contract Against
Activity, Risk, and Information Variables
Deutsche Mark Japanese Yen
Independent Variables Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics
Intercept 11.6002 29.88b 11.6965 22.93b
NTRANS 10.0446 122.07b 10.0475 119.67b
NGK 15.8543 6.21 30.4039 9.51b
PRDUM 10.853 14.11b 10.7435 12.72b
Interval 1 7.3781 21.24b 6.2545 14.60b
Interval 2 3.2195 9.96b 2.9005 7.33b
Interval 3 2.2179 6.78b 1.6857 4.24b
Interval 4 1.9434 5.85b 1.0087 2.48b
Interval 5 1.0061 3.02b 0.3092 0.76
Interval 6 0.8143 2.43a 0.3570 0.88
Interval 8 0.4380 1.32 0.2077 0.52
Interval 9 1.0759 3.26b 0.5215 1.27
Interval 10 0.3515 1.04 0.7018 1.73
Interval 11 0.6546 1.94 0.4386 1.07
Interval 12 1.2178 3.65b 0.2675 0.67
Interval 13 4.6912 14.45b 3.8241 9.82b
Monday 1.1251 5.51b 0.9853 3.99b
Tuesday 0.4407 2.19a 0.5287 2.16a
Wednesday 0.2799 1.38 0.0479 0.20
Thursday 0.3947 1.90 0.3529 1.40
March 0.6131 2.13a 1.8801 6.91b
June 1.1975 4.79b 1.5719 4.38b
September 0.4991 2.56b 0.1052 0.31
N 2572 2309
Adjusted R2 0.3296 0.2616
F-Statistic 58.44b 38.17b
Notes: The trading period from 7:20 AM to 2:00 PM within each trading day is divided into thirteen time intervals: The first
interval has 40 minutes and the remaining twelve intervals consist of 30 minutes each for a total of 400 minutes. BASs are
first estimated for each time interval and trading day. They are then regressed against variables that represent the level
activity, risk, information, and interest parity together with three sets of dummy variables (D1, D2, D3) that serve to measure
intraday, weekday, and seasonal effects, respectively. Activity level is measured through the number of transactions
(NTRANS) in each time interval. Differential risk across time intervals in each day is captured through the German-Klass
(1980) volatility measure (GK) that takes into account the open, high, low, and closing prices. The variable NGK is 10,000
times GK. Information effects are evaluated by a price level dummy variable (PRDUM) for each time interval. The median
transaction price is first identified from the entire time series. The average price within each interval is then computed and
compared to the overall median price. If the average price is greater than the median price, then the variable PRDUM is
assigned a value of one. Otherwise, a value of zero is assigned.
aSignificant at the 0.05 level.
bSignificant at the 0.01 level.
market and supports the results of McInish and Wood (1992) for the
stock market. Copeland and Galai (1983) had argued that higher price
levels in the stock market are associated with larger spreads because of a
higher informational uncertainty due to the bidding up of prices by in-
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formed traders. But my finding of lower spread levels when prices in-
crease supports the notion of the presence of economies of scale in trad-
ing futures contracts. Thus Hypothesis 3, which states that there is no
relationship between BASs and prices, does not hold.
The existence of intraday patterns in BASs implies that the size of
the BAS depends on the time interval in a trading day. The first five and
last two intervals of trading for the DM contract contribute positively and
significantly to BASs at the 0.01 level. These are evidenced by the statis-
tically significant interval dummy variables at the 99% confidence level.
These intervals encompass the time from 7:20 am to 10:00 am, and from
1:00 pm to 2:00 pm, respectively. For the JY contract, BASs are positively
significant at the 0.01 level during the first four and the last intervals of
trading. These occur during the trading times from 7:20 am to 9:30 am,
and from 1:30 pm to 2:00 pm, respectively. The results demonstrate that,
except in interval 9 for the DM contract, it may be less costly to trade
during the interior time periods of a trading day.
Higher spreads at the beginning of a trading day may be due to cer-
tain traders having less information and their uncertainty about the be-
havior of the market. It can also be attributed to some traders having
private or superior information that are not available to others. The higher
BASs serve to compensate the unofficial market makers for assuming the
risk of uninformed trading. The higher price risk at the end of the trading
day and the resultant increase in spreads may be caused by the uncer-
tainty related to an increase in the possibility of carrying undesirable
inventory overnight. There are also weekday trading patterns in the FXF
market. Both the DM and JY contracts portray significantly positive co-
efficients in the weekday dummy variables on Monday (at the 0.01 level)
and on Tuesday (at the 0.05 level). This phenomenon reveals a weekday
preference for trading that may be related to a varying cost of transaction.
The coefficients of the dummy variables for each contract delivery
month are all positive. They are significant at the 0.01 level for the June
and September DM contracts, and the March and June JY contracts. In
addition, the March DM contract is significantly related to BASs at the
0.05 level. These results indicate that there are differences in BASs by
delivery months, suggesting the presence of a seasonal effect in BASs.
The findings reveal that it may be less costly, in terms of the BAS, to
transact in the FXF market for nearby December DM and JY contracts,
and more costly to execute trades in nearby June DM and March JY
contracts. The lower BAS for December contracts is consistent with a
higher trading activity which saw 85,299 price changes for the DM con-
tracts and 102,553 price changes for the JY contracts. This contrasts with
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70,538 and 48,228 observations for the March DM and JY contracts,
respectively; 65,837 and 66,113 for the June contracts; and 72,828 and
65,086 for the September contracts.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article has investigated and analyzed the intraday determinants of
BASs in the FXF market. It has been found that the number of transac-
tions and the volatility of FXF prices are major determinants of intraday
BASs. The number of transactions is negatively related to BASs, whereas
volatility in general is positively related. These variables proxy for activity
level and risk and are consistent with findings from previous studies. This
study also finds that there are economies of scale in trading FXF
contracts.
Intraday and weekday patterns in BASs have been found. BASs ex-
hibit a U-shape pattern during the trading day, whereas BASs are higher
during Mondays and Tuesdays than during other days of the week. Higher
spreads at the beginning and end of a trading day reflect the presence of
adverse selection and the possibility of carrying undesirable inventory
overnight, respectively. There are also seasonal differences in BASs that
have been found in the analysis.
Although this paper has investigated and identified some key deter-
minants of BASs in the FXF market, it recognizes the possibility that
others may exist. The identification of such other determinants is best
left to future research to examine the stability of the present determinants
over time and contract type. In general, however, activity levels and risk
are thought to be stable determinants and are found to support those of
previous studies. Moreover, the patterns of BASs should also prove to be
time and contract invariant.
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Recent studies show that decimal pricing led to significant reductions in the spread and depth 
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pricing. We also find that decimal pricing led to nontrivial changes in select stock attributes, 
and that these changes exerted an additional impact on spreads and depths. Our results 
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initiated a pilot program on August 28, 2000 with seven listed issues trading in dol-
lars and cents, followed by 57 issues on September 25, 2000, and 94 issues on Decem-
ber 4, 2000. The NYSE completed the conversion on January 29, 2001 by trading all
remaining issues in decimals.
In this study, we investigate principal factors that led to the changes in the spread
and depth from decimal pricing. Specifically, we examine how much of the inter-
stock differences in spread and depth changes that are associated with decimal pric-
ing can be explained by the inter-stock differences in the percentages of one tick
spreads and odd-sixteenth quotes, trading frequency, and share price before decimal-
ization. Our study helps assess how much of the observed changes in the spread and
depth can be attributed to binding constraint, front running, price competition,
quote rounding, and concurrent changes in stock attributes. Our results show which
stocks benefited most from decimalization and help assess the likely effect of sub-
penny pricing for different stocks.
Numerous studies analyse the impact of decimalization on trading costs and mar-
ket quality. Chakravarty et al. (2001a,b) show that decimal pricing resulted in lower
quoted and effective spreads. They also find that the available depths at the best bid
and ask prices are significantly smaller after decimalization. The authors conclude
that their findings deliver a mixed verdict on the net effect of decimal pricing on mar-
ket quality. Similarly, Bacidore et al. (2001) and the NYSE (2001a,b) show that
NYSE stocks exhibit smaller spreads and depths after decimalization. NASDAQ
(2001a), Chung et al. (in press), and Bessembinder (2003b) compare trading costs be-
tween the NYSE and NASDAQ after decimalization.
Chakravarty et al. (in press) isolate the effects of decimalization using a matched
sample of decimal and non-decimal stocks on the NYSE. They find that the quoted
depth as well as the quoted and effective spreads decline significantly following dec-
imalization. Bacidore et al. (2003) use NYSE system order data to examine changes
in trader behavior, displayed liquidity supply, and execution quality around decimal-
ization. They find that although traders do not reduce the use of limit orders in favor
of market orders or non-displayed orders, they decrease limit order size and cancel
limit orders more frequently after decimalization. However, the study shows that the
lower displayed liquidity does not result in poor execution quality.
Although prior studies show that both spreads and depths declined after decimal-
ization, they provide limited evidence on why such changes occurred. Thus, the main
causes of these declines have not been well understood. Most studies (see Bacidore
et al., 2001; Bessembinder, 2003b) find larger declines in spreads for large-capitaliza-
tion or high-volume stocks and interpret the result as evidence that the pre-decimal-
ization tick size ($1/16) was more likely a binding constraint on spread widths for
these stocks. None of these studies, however, provides evidence regarding how much
of the decline in the spread and depth can actually be attributed to the reduced bind-
ing constraint, and how much to other factors such as front running, stepping ahead
(price improvement), quote rounding, and changes in stock attributes. In the present
study we provide such evidence.
It is useful to note the difference between front running by sell-side intermediaries
(e.g. specialists, market makers, and brokers) and stepping ahead of the existing
2982 K.H. Chung et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 28 (2004) 2981–3007
queue by buy-side traders (e.g. pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds). The
former is unethical if not illegal if it is undertaken with the knowledge of customer
order flow that will move price. The latter is simple price competition that is done
with no knowledge of order flow for the purpose of improving the likelihood of get-
ting an execution.
Theory suggests at least four possible causes of spread and depth changes that are
associated with decimalization (see Harris, 1994, 1997, 1999; Ronen and Weaver,
2001). Decimal pricing is likely to narrow the spread because a smaller tick size re-
duces the probability that the minimum price variation is a binding constraint on
spread widths. The relaxation of the binding constraint is also likely to reduce the
depth because sell-side liquidity providers may slide down the liquidity supply sche-
dule along with the smaller spread. Although prior studies provide indirect evidence
on this issue by showing that decimal pricing has a greater impact on high-volume
and/or large-capitalization stocks, no direct evidence exists in support of this hypoth-
esis.
Decimal pricing may reduce the depth because of the higher risk of front running
imposed upon buy-side traders by specialists. The smaller tick size may narrow
spreads even when the minimum price variation is not a binding constraint because
both buy-side traders and specialists are more likely to improve existing quotes. Dec-
imal pricing may narrow spreads because the smaller tick size reduces quote round-
ing. Finally, decimal pricing is likely to change the spread and depth because the
smaller tick size can alter the factors that influence the spread and depth. For exam-
ple, the smaller tick size may lead to higher trading activity and, consequently, nar-
rower spreads. Similarly, it may result in lower return volatility and thus narrower
spreads. For example, Ronen and Weaver (2001) find significant decreases in both
daily and transitory volatility after the tick size reduction on the American Stock Ex-
change.
The spread and depth reduction due to the relaxation of the binding constraint is
expected to be a positive function of the probability that the minimum price varia-
tion was a binding constraint before decimal pricing. In contrast, the spread and
depth changes triggered by the increased risk of front running and price competition
are likely to be related to the probability of front running and price competition after
decimal pricing. In this study, we measure the binding-constraint probability by the
proportion of spread quotes that are equal to the minimum price variation ($1/16)
before decimalization. We measure the front-running probability and price competi-
tion by the proportion of odd-sixteenth quotes and the intensity of trading before
decimalization. We consider changes in five stock attributes – share price, number
of trades, trade size, return volatility, and market capitalization – as additional
sources of spread and depth changes after decimal pricing. 1
Our results show that the observed reductions in the spread and depth are
positively correlated with the pre-decimalization proportions of one-tick spreads
1 Prior studies suggest these variables as determinants of spreads and depths. See, e.g. Stoll (1978),
McInish and Wood (1992), Harris (1994), and Bessembinder (1999).
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and odd-sixteenth quotes, indicating that stocks with the most one-tick spreads
and the least quote clustering benefited the most from decimal pricing. We also
find that stocks with a greater number of trades before decimalization exhibited
larger reductions in the spread and depth after decimal pricing. These results are
consistent with the notion that relaxation of the binding constraint and the
increased price competition and front running led to smaller spreads and depths
after decimal pricing. Decimal pricing led to nontrivial changes in select stock
attributes and these changes exerted an additional impact on spreads and depths.
The intraday pattern of the observed changes in spreads and depths is highly
correlated with the intraday variation in the proportion of one-tick spreads, suggest-
ing that the extent to which the pre-decimalization tick size was a binding constraint
varied across different times of the day. Finally, our results suggest that sub-
penny pricing may further reduce the spreads of high-volume, low-risk, or low-price
stocks.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the likely effects of
decimal pricing on the spread and depth and establish our hypotheses. Section 3
explains our data source, the measurement of key variables, and sample characteris-
tics. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 addresses the question of
whether the penny tick size is a binding constraint for certain stocks. Section 6 pro-
vides a brief summary and concluding remarks.
2. The effects of decimal pricing on the spread and depth of NYSE stocks
In this section, we describe how decimal pricing can affect the spread and depth in
different ways.
2.1. Probability that the minimum price variation is a binding constraint on spread
widths
The minimum price variation limits the prices that liquidity providers can quote.
Liquidity providers cannot narrow the bid–ask spread when the spread is equal to
one tick. Decimal pricing will narrow spreads when the minimum price variation
was a binding constraint on spread widths before decimalization. Because sell-side
liquidity providers are likely to quote smaller depths at narrower spreads (i.e. the
liquidity-supply schedule is positively sloped), decimal pricing would also lower
the depth through its effect on the spread.
The probability that the minimum price variation is a binding constraint on
spread widths is likely to be positively related to the proportion of spreads equal
to one tick. This is because the observed spread will be one tick whenever the equi-
librium spread (i.e. the spread that liquidity providers would have quoted had there
been no binding constraint) is less than one tick. Hence, we employ the proportion of
spread quotes that are equal to the pre-decimal tick size ($1/16) as our empirical
proxy for the probability that the tick size was a binding constraint on spread widths.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
2984 K.H. Chung et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 28 (2004) 2981–3007
Hypothesis 1. Decimal pricing leads to larger declines in spreads and depths for
stocks with higher proportions of spread quotes that are equal to $1/16 before
decimal pricing.
2.2. Front running and price competition
The NYSE uses price and time priority rules to determine which orders will be
filled first. The price priority rule requires that orders with the highest bid and lowest
ask prices must be filled before those with inferior prices. The time priority rule re-
quires that, among public orders, the first order at a given price must be filled before
other orders are filled. 2 The time priority rule is meaningful only if the minimum
price variation is nontrivial. The minimum price increment determines the cost of
obtaining precedence through price priority when a trader does not have time prece-
dence at a given price. If the increment is very small, the cost of obtaining precedence
is negligible because traders can obtain precedence simply by bettering the existing
quotes by insignificant amounts. Hence, the minimum price variation determines
the probability (and also profitability) of stepping in front of existing orders.
Decimal pricing greatly reduces the cost of front running by the sell side (e.g. spe-
cialists), and thus specialists are more likely to engage in front running at the expense
of the buy side (e.g. institutional and retail traders). In turn, buy-side traders (e.g.
institutional traders, in particular) are likely to defend themselves from front runners
by using floor brokers to hide their orders, breaking up their orders, and switching
from limit order strategies to market order strategies (Harris, 1999). 3 In addition,
because smaller tick increments imply a smaller barrier to competition for buy-side
traders, they are likely to compete more actively with price while offering a smaller
quantity at a given price. Based on these considerations, we expect decimal pricing to
reduce displayed depths. 4
The effect of the reduced cost of front running on spreads is less obvious. The re-
duced cost of front running may result in wider spreads because of an increase in the
adverse selection risk faced by buy-side traders. If limit orders are disadvantaged fre-
quently enough, buy-side traders may alter order submission strategies and reduce
their use of limit orders, resulting in wider spreads. Conversely, the smaller tick size
may narrow spreads because both buy-side traders and specialists are more likely to
improve existing quotes. Both the buy- and sell-sides are more able and willing to
2 On the NYSE, Rule 2072 requires that the time priority rule be strictly enforced for the first public bid
(or offer) at a given price. The NYSE enforces price priority and uses a combination of order size and
order placement time to determine priority for limit orders that are tied on price. Price and time priority
rules are not enforced, however, across the markets that trade NYSE-listed stocks. For example, limit
orders left with Boston, Pacific, or Cincinnati Exchanges do not have time priority over limit orders left
with the NYSE. In the present study, we exclude off-NYSE quotes and trades from the study sample.
3 As some of the recent NYSE scandals have highlighted, front running oftentimes involves floor
brokers as well.
4 We recognize that this line of arguments may not hold on NASDAQ, considering the ongoing growth
of Electronic Communications Network (ECN) and the failure of Supermontage.
K.H. Chung et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 28 (2004) 2981–3007 2985
improve the quote when it costs only one penny instead of 6.25 cents to do so.
Hence, the net effect of the reduced tick size is likely to be determined by the relative
strengths of these forces.
Bacidore et al. (2001) find a significant decrease in the distance between limit
order prices and the contemporaneous spread midpoint after decimalization and
conclude that limit order traders are more aggressive under penny pricing. In a sim-
ilar vein, Jennings (2001) finds that the proportion of one-tick quote updates that im-
proved both sides of the National Best Bid or Offer increased from 1% of the quote
updates before decimalization to 5% after decimalization, indicating the increased
competitiveness of the quoting environment. 5 Hence, it appears that traders use
the increased flexibility of decimals to compete more intensely on price. These con-
siderations suggest that decimal pricing is likely to reduce spreads even when the pre-
decimalization tick size was not a binding constraint on spread widths (i.e. spreads
were larger than $1/16).
Sell-side intermediaries (specialists, in particular) are more likely to engage in
front running when there is less uncertainty about asset value because the profitabil-
ity of front running depends on the accuracy of their prediction of future price move-
ments. Similarly, buy-side traders are more likely to improve existing quotes when
asset value uncertainty is lower. Harris (1991) and Grossman et al. (1997) show that
coarser price grids are used more frequently when underlying asset values are uncer-
tain. As a result, the extent of front running and price competition under decimal
pricing is likely to be higher (lower) for stocks that exhibited finer (coarser) price
grids before decimalization. Hence, finer price grids that resulted from decimal pric-
ing are likely to have greater front-running and price competition effects on stocks
that exhibited lower quote clustering around even-sixteenths before decimalization.
These considerations lead to our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Decimal pricing leads to larger declines in spreads and depths for
stocks with higher proportions of odd-sixteenth quotes before decimal pricing.
2.3. Quote rounding
Bid–ask spreads in markets with small tick sizes would be narrower than those in
markets with large tick sizes (even when the equilibrium spread is greater than the
minimum price variation) if market makers tend to round up their quoted spreads.
For example, suppose that the equilibrium spread is 10 cents. If the tick size were $1/
16 and the spread were rounded up to the next available level, the observed spread
would be $2/16 (12.5 cents). However, the observed spread would be 10 cents if the
tick size were only one penny. Hence, we expect bid–ask spreads to decline after dec-
imal pricing even when the tick size was not a binding constraint on spread widths
5 Consistent with Harris’ (1997, 1999) conjecture, Jennings (2001) also finds that the primary source of
one-tick quote improvements changed from agency orders to principal orders in the months following
decimal pricing, indicating that the smaller tick size plays into the hands of professional traders.
2986 K.H. Chung et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 28 (2004) 2981–3007
before decimalization. Because quote rounding is equally likely to occur across
stocks with different attributes, we expect to observe a decline in the spread that is
independent of stock attributes (such as the proportion of spread quotes that are
equal to $1/16 and the proportion of odd-sixteenth quotes).
2.4. Changes in stock attributes and their impact on the spread and depth
To the extent that decimal pricing accompanied changes in stock attributes which
have an effect on the spread and depth, the observed changes in the spread and depth
may be attributed, at least in part, to the changes in stock attributes. Prior studies
suggest that a decrease in tick size generally results in a greater number of trades,
smaller trade sizes, and lower return volatility. For example, NYSE (2001b) reports
a significant increase in the number of trades and a decrease in trade size after deci-
malization. The study also finds that the degree of price change associated with exe-
cuting a given number of shares is considerably lower after decimalization.
Bessembinder (2003b) shows that intraday return volatility declined after decimali-
zation. He finds that the median return volatility declined from 2.04% in the pre-
decimalization sample to 1.56% in the post-decimalization sample using a sample
of NYSE stocks.
Our study design involves a ‘‘before and after’’ comparison and uses data during
two time periods: 30 trading days immediately before and after the implementation
of decimal pricing. To the extent that there are any changes in stock attributes be-
tween these two time periods, they are likely to have an effect on the spread and
depth. For example, the spread as a percentage of share price will be affected by
changes in share price as well as changes in the dollar spread. In addition, there
may be some exogenously determined shifts in market volatility between the two
periods.
In our study, we include the changes in five stock attributes (i.e. share price, num-
ber of trades, trade size, return volatility, and market capitalization) in the regression
model to determine how much of the observed changes in the spread and depth can
be attributed to changes in these stock attributes.
3. Data source, variable measurement, and descriptive statistics
We obtain data used in this study from the NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ) data-
base. Our initial sample consists of 2,629 NYSE-traded common stocks available in
the TAQ database. From the initial sample, we omit 19 stocks that have a minimum
price variation smaller than $1/16 before decimalization. In addition, we drop seven
stocks that do not have sufficient data during either the pre- or post-decimalization
period. This leaves us with the final study sample of 2,603 stocks – seven stocks from
the first pilot (August 28, 2000), 49 stocks from the second pilot (September 25,
2000), 81 stocks from the third pilot (December 4, 2000), and 2,466 stocks from
the full implementation (January 29, 2001) of decimal pricing.
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To examine the effects of decimalization on the spread and depth, we use trade
and quote data during 30 trading days immediately before and after the date on
which each implementation group was subject to decimal pricing. We omit the fol-
lowing to minimize data errors: (1) quotes if either the ask price or the bid price is
less than or equal to zero; (2) quotes if either the ask size or the bid size is less than
or equal to zero; (3) quotes if the bid price is greater than or equal to the ask price;
(3) quotes if the bid–ask spread is greater than $5; (4) before-the-open and after-the-
close trades and quotes; (5) trades if the price or volume is less than or equal to zero;
and (6) out-of-sequence trades and quotes.
Table 1 shows select attributes of our study sample of 2,603 stocks during the pre-
and post-decimalization study periods for each pilot as well as the full implementa-
tion. We measure share price by the average daily closing quote midpoint and return
volatility by the standard deviation of daily returns calculated from the daily closing
quote midpoints. The table also reports the results of paired comparison t-tests on
the mean absolute and mean relative differences in stock attributes between the
pre- and post-decimalization study periods. The mean absolute difference is the mean
difference in the stock attribute between the pre- and post-decimalization study peri-
ods. The mean relative difference is the cross-sectional mean of the ratio of the abso-
lute difference to the pre-decimalization value of the stock attribute.
Consistent with the results reported in prior studies (e.g. NYSE, 2001b; Bessem-
binder, 2003b), we find that decimal pricing led to an increase in the number of
trades for all three pilots and the full implementation group. We find mixed results,
however, for other stock attributes. Decimal pricing led to a significant decrease in
return volatility for the full implementation group. In contrast, return volatility is
higher after decimalization for the second and third pilots and remains the same
for the first pilot. Similarly, trade size is smaller after decimal pricing for the full
implementation group but larger for the first pilot. We observe significant increases
in both share price and market capitalization after decimalization for the full imple-
mentation group. On the whole, these results indicate that at least some part of the
observed changes in the spread and depth after decimal pricing may be due to con-
current changes in stock attributes.
3.1. Execution costs
We employ four measures of execution cost in this study: the quoted spread
in dollars ½ðAi;t  Bi;tÞ, the quoted spread as a proportion of share price
½ðAi;t  Bi;tÞ=Mi;t, the effective spread in dollars ½2  Di;t  ðPi;t Mi;tÞ, and the effective
spread as a proportion of share price ½2  Di;t  ðPi;t Mi;tÞ=Mi;t, where Ai;t is the
quoted ask price for stock i at time t, Bi;t is the quoted bid price for stock i at time
t, Mi;t is the midpoint of Ai;t and Bi;t, Pi;t is the transaction price for stock i at time t,
and Di;t is a binary variable which equals +1 for buyer-initiated trades and )1 for
seller-initiated trades. Bessembinder (2003a) suggests that making no allowance
for trade reporting lags is optimal when assessing whether trades are buyer or seller
initiated, but comparing trade prices with earlier quotations is optimal when assess-
ing trade execution costs. In this study, we estimate Di;t using the algorithm suggested
2988 K.H. Chung et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 28 (2004) 2981–3007
Table 1
Descriptive statistics before and after decimalization
Before decimalization After decimalization Mean difference
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Absolute t-Statistic Relative t-Statistic
Panel A: August 28, 2000 Pilot (N ¼ 7)
Number of trades 229 39 270 274 42 319 45 2.32 0.3538 2.93*
Trade size ($1000) 53.63 14.93 60.30 62.43 18.90 68.58 8.80 2.73* 0.2129 3.29*
Share price 36.50 37.32 17.56 38.19 37.11 19.35 1.69 0.92 0.0389 1.15
Return volatility 0.0193 0.0184 0.0058 0.0240 0.0218 0.0163 0.0047 1.02 0.1592 0.77
Market value of equity ($ million) 6,056 689 7,664 6,954 705 8,339 898 0.90 0.1112 1.06
Panel B: September 25, 2000 Pilot (N ¼ 49)
Number of trades 245 69 439 302 99 511 58 3.30** 0.3104 5.74**
Trade size ($1000) 52.48 35.73 46.77 50.94 32.85 52.44 )1.536 )0.53 )0.0430 )1.11
Share price 48.51 28.86 72.35 39.76 29.13 36.85 )8.75 )1.39 )0.0660 )3.35**
Return volatility 0.0212 0.0184 0.0141 0.0328 0.0278 0.0277 0.0116 2.88** 0.7261 3.34**
Market value of equity ($ million) 9,318 1,020 24,442 8,902 901 22,899 )415 )1.47 )0.0479 )3.30**
Panel C: December 4, 2000 Pilot (N ¼ 81)
Number of trades 161 35 312 198 53 337 37 5.96** 0.4587 10.35**
Trade size ($1000) 30.42 17.64 33.03 30.16 16.72 35.68 )0.263 )0.16 0.0154 0.42
Share price 18.49 13.48 14.15 18.94 14.07 14.69 0.45 1.84 0.0070 0.49
Return volatility 0.0267 0.0231 0.0165 0.0292 0.0268 0.0169 0.0025 1.95 0.2341 4.24**
Market value of equity ($ million) 3,529 368 11,042 3,483 396 10,703 )46 )0.58 )0.0040 )0.25
Panel D: January 29, 2001 Full (N ¼ 2466)
Number of trades 195 59 360 210 61 369 15 11.34** 0.0664 8.71**
Trade size ($1000) 35.18 22.24 37.06 30.87 19.27 35.09 )4.310 )10.61** )0.0530 )3.03**
Share price 23.99 17.87 23.35 24.55 19.02 23.14 0.56 8.58** 0.0602 13.55**
Return volatility 0.0321 0.0272 0.0249 0.0243 0.0203 0.0350 )0.0078 )10.53** )0.1912 )13.50**
Market value of equity ($ million) 4,578 518 20,825 4,533 549 20,421 )45 )0.92 0.0650 13.01**
This table shows select attributes of the study sample of stocks during the pre- and post-decimalization study periods for each pilot as well as the full implementation group. We measure
share price by the average daily closing quote midpoint and return volatility by the standard deviation of daily returns calculated from the daily closing quote midpoints. The table also
reports the results of paired comparison t-tests on the mean absolute and mean relative differences in stock attributes between the pre- and post-decimalization study periods. The mean
absolute difference is simply the mean difference in the stock attribute between the pre- and post-decimalization study periods. The mean relative difference is the cross-sectional mean of the
ratio of the absolute difference to the pre-decimalization value of the stock attribute. N denotes the sample size.






















































by Lee and Ready (1991) and modified by Bessembinder (2003a). The effective
spread measures the actual cost paid by the trader. We measure the quoted depth
in both dollars and round lots. 6
For each stock, we first calculate the time-weighted quoted spread, the trade-
weighted effective spread, and the time-weighted quoted depth during the pre- and
post-decimalization study periods, respectively. We then calculate the cross-sectional
means of these variables during each period. The results (see Table 2) show that dec-
imal pricing led to a significant decrease in both the quoted and effective spreads
across all four implementation groups. For example, the quoted dollar spread de-
clined by 3.2–7.1 cents after decimalization across different groups. These are equiv-
alent to a decline of about 24–31% in relative terms. Similarly, the effective dollar
spread declined by 2.8–5 cents across different groups, which are equivalent to 29–
40% declines in relative terms. The results show that decimal pricing led to 30–
36% declines in the quoted depth, except for the first pilot. Overall, these results
are qualitatively identical to those reported in Chakravarty et al. (2001a,b), Bacidore
et al. (2001), NYSE (2001a,b), NASDAQ (2001b), and Bessembinder (2003b).
3.2. Binding constraint on spread widths
We measure the probability that the minimum price variation is a binding con-
straint on spread widths by the proportion of quoted spreads that are equal to $1/16
(PQMIN_QS hereafter) before decimalization. To assess the sensitivity of our results
to different measurement methods, we also calculate the proportion of trading time
during which the quoted spread is equal to $1/16 (PTMIN_QS). In addition, we calcu-
late the proportion of effective spreads that are equal to one tick (PQMIN_ES). Both
PQMIN_QS and PTMIN_QS measure the probability that liquidity providers could
not have narrowed existing quotes due to the binding constraint.
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the mean (median) values of PQMIN_QS,
PTMIN_QS, and PQMIN_ES are 0.31 (0.30), 0.32 (0.31), and 0.44 (0.45), respec-
tively, with standard deviations of 0.20, 0.21, and 0.18. More than 50% of our sample
stocks have PQMIN_QS, PTMIN_QS, and PQMIN_ES values that are greater than
30%, indicating that the minimum price variation is a significant binding constraint
on liquidity providers’ quote decisions for many stocks.
We expect the probability that the minimum price variation is a binding con-
straint on spread widths to be negatively related to the equilibrium spread – the
spread that liquidity providers would have quoted had there been no binding con-
straint (i.e. when the minimum price variation is infinitesimally small). To the extent
that the equilibrium spread is a function of stock attributes, we expect PQMIN_QS,
PTMIN_QS, and PQMIN_ES to be related to the stock attributes. In particular,
because high-volume, low-risk, or low-price stocks are likely to have smaller equilib-
rium spreads, we expect PQMIN_QS, PTMIN_QS, and PQMIN_ES to be positively
6 The share depth is measured by the sum of bid and ask sizes. The dollar depth is the product of the
share depth and the quote midpoint.
2990 K.H. Chung et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 28 (2004) 2981–3007
Table 2
Spreads and depths before and after decimalization
Before decimalization After decimalization Mean difference
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Absolute t-Statistic Relative t-Statistic
Panel A: August 28, 2000 Pilot (N ¼ 7)
Quoted spread ($) 0.2071 0.1646 0.1126 0.1360 0.1215 0.0548 )0.0712 )3.13* )0.3081 )7.39**
Quoted spread (%) 0.0078 0.0084 0.0059 0.0050 0.0054 0.0038 )0.0028 )3.29* )0.3320 )7.50**
Effective spread ($) 0.1244 0.0884 0.0811 0.0741 0.0475 0.0460 )0.0503 )3.69* )0.3998 )15.93**
Effective spread (%) 0.0047 0.0045 0.0039 0.0028 0.0023 0.0025 )0.0019 )3.55* )0.4191 )15.28**
Quoted depth ($1000) 212 63 241 138 66 132 )74 )1.76 )0.0107 )0.07
Quoted depth (round lots) 49 39 41 33 39 18 )16 )1.63 )0.0309 )0.19
Panel B: September 25, 2000 Pilot (N ¼ 49)
Quoted spread ($) 0.2007 0.1460 0.2789 0.1485 0.1204 0.1205 )0.0522 )2.13* )0.1968 )7.47**
Quoted spread (%) 0.0068 0.0051 0.0052 0.0059 0.0042 0.0048 )0.0009 )2.96** )0.1271 )4.59**
Effective spread ($) 0.1163 0.0839 0.1220 0.0808 0.0719 0.0587 )0.0355 )3.30** )0.2872 )9.65**
Effective spread (%) 0.0044 0.0029 0.0036 0.0035 0.0020 0.0031 )0.0009 )3.81** )0.2261 )7.22**
Quoted depth ($1000) 376 186 578 186 122 247 )189 )3.53** )0.3604 )9.74**
Quoted depth (round lots) 138 59 257 61 37 79 )77 )2.94** )0.3075 )7.73**
Panel C: December 4, 2000 Pilot (N ¼ 82)
Quoted spread ($) 0.1523 0.1321 0.0717 0.1177 0.1028 0.0681 )0.0346 )13.29** )0.2452 )13.39**
Quoted spread (%) 0.0163 0.0101 0.0199 0.0125 0.0080 0.0139 )0.0038 )4.09** )0.2385 )11.06**
Effective spread ($) 0.0926 0.0825 0.0355 0.0644 0.0534 0.0425 )0.0283 )15.38** )0.3440 )15.91**
Effective spread (%) 0.0104 0.0064 0.0130 0.0072 0.0045 0.0083 )0.0033 )4.95** )0.3380 )14.24**
Quoted depth ($1000) 187 91 234 86 70 73 )100 )4.83** )0.3174 )8.32**
Quoted depth (round lots) 135 70 243 56 48 37 )79 )3.26** )0.3141 )8.05**
Panel D: January 29, 2001 Full (N ¼ 2466)
Quoted spread ($) 0.1621 0.1339 0.1445 0.1301 0.1001 0.1480 )0.0320 )26.30** )0.2412 )62.79**
Quoted spread (%) 0.0132 0.0081 0.0168 0.0097 0.0055 0.0134 )0.0034 )26.25** )0.2781 )74.46**
Effective spread ($) 0.0979 0.0784 0.0935 0.0688 0.0490 0.0909 )0.0290 )38.10** )0.3529 )83.94**
Effective spread (%) 0.0084 0.0051 0.0111 0.0054 0.0029 0.0078 )0.0029 )27.72** )0.3846 )94.97**
Quoted depth ($1000) 223 114 614 104 71 140 )118 )11.79** )0.3138 )41.35**
Quoted depth (round lots) 140 64 510 55 39 94 )85 )9.83** )0.3490 )49.78**
For each stock we first calculate the time-weighted quoted spread, the trade-weighted effective spread, and the time-weighted quoted depth during the pre- and post-decimalization study periods, respectively. We
calculate both the dollar and proportional quoted and effective spreads and the depth in dollars and in round lots. We then calculate the cross-sectional means of these variables during each period. The table also
reports the results of paired t-tests on the equality of the mean between the two periods. N denotes the sample size.






















































related to the number of trades and trade size, and negatively to share price and re-
turn volatility.
Indeed, when we regress PQMIN_QS, PTMIN_QS, and PQMIN_ES against a
common set of explanatory variables (i.e. log of share price, number of trades, trade
Table 3
Determinants of the proportion of one-tick spreads during the pre-decimalization period
PQMIN_QS PTMIN_QS PQMIN_ES
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Mean 0.3140 0.3230 0.4416
Standard deviation 0.1959 0.2094 0.1839
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1st percentile 0.0030 0.0002 0.0243
5th percentile 0.0310 0.0241 0.1142
10th percentile 0.0654 0.0585 0.1852
25th percentile 0.1614 0.1535 0.3178
50th percentile 0.3005 0.3053 0.4523
75th percentile 0.4358 0.4602 0.5619
90th percentile 0.5780 0.6141 0.6630
95th percentile 0.6737 0.7142 0.7398
99th percentile 0.8462 0.8606 0.8779
Maximum 0.9744 0.9729 0.9840
N 2,603 2,603 2,603
Variable
Panel B: Logit regression results
Intercept )5.3575 ()58.24)** )6.1743 ()49.97)** )3.5148 ()44.93)**
Pilot 1 dummy )0.4133 ()1.78) )0.8210 ()2.63)** )0.1445 ()0.73)
Pilot 2 dummy 0.1707 (1.92) 0.1495 (1.25) 0.0317 (0.42)
Pilot 3 dummy )0.1319 ()1.89) )0.0968 ()1.03) )0.1233 ()2.08)*
Log(share price) )1.4580 ()66.53)** )1.6233 ()55.15)** )1.0385 ()55.73)**
Log(number of trades) 0.8801 (42.61)** 1.0542 (37.99)** 0.6333 (36.05)**
Log(trade size) 0.2889 (10.50)** 0.2510 (6.79)** 0.1105 (4.72)**
Log(return volatility) )1.1437 ()47.05)** )1.3361 ()40.92)** )0.8752 ()42.33)**
Log(market value of
equity)
)0.0392 ()2.27)* )0.0459 ()1.97)* 0.0018 (0.13)
F -statistic 989.07** 731.66** 712.76**
Adjusted R2 0.7538 0.6936 0.688
We measure the probability that the minimum price variation is a binding constraint on spread widths by
the proportion of quoted spreads that are equal to $1/16 (PQMIN_QS) during the pre-decimalization
study period. To assess the sensitivity of our results to different measurement methods, we also calculate
the proportion of trading time during which the quoted spread is equal to $1/16 (PTMIN_QS). In
addition, we calculate the proportion of effective spreads that are equal to one tick (PQMIN_ES). Panel A
reports the descriptive statistics of the three measures of the binding constraints. Panel B presents the Logit
regression results showing how these variables are related to stock attributes (share price, number of
trades, trade size, return volatility, and market value of equity). To determine whether the relation between
the logits and stock attributes differs across decimalization implementation groups, we include three pilot
dummy variables in the regressions. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. N denotes the sample size.
* and ** statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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size, return volatility, market capitalization, and three dummy variables for the dec-
imal pricing pilots), we find that the results are consistent with our expectation (see
Table 3). 7 We also find that these explanatory variables account for about 70% of
the cross-sectional variation in PQMIN_QS, PTMIN_QS, and PQMIN_ES.
4. Empirical findings
In the previous section, we show that decimal pricing led to significant reductions
in the spread and depth. We also find evidence that the minimum price variation was
a binding constraint on spreads before decimal pricing. In addition, we find signifi-
cant differences in stock attributes between the pre- and post-decimalization study
periods. In this section, we examine how the observed changes in the spread and
depth are related to the proportion of one-tick spreads, the proportion of odd-
sixteenth quotes, and the changes in stock attributes.
4.1. Spread and depth changes as a function of the binding probability and quote
clustering
To assess how the relaxation of the binding constraint affected the spread and
depth, we first cluster our study sample of 2603 stocks into 10 portfolios (each with
an approximately equal number of stocks) according to the proportion of one-tick
quoted spreads before decimalization (PQMIN_QS). 8 We then calculate the per-
centage changes in the quoted spread and depth within each portfolio. Similarly,
we cluster our sample into 10 portfolios according to the proportion of one-tick
effective spreads (PQMIN_ES) and calculate the percentage changes in the effective
spread within each portfolio.
We show the results in Panel A of Table 4. Notice that there is a strong positive
correlation between the observed reduction in the spread and depth and PQMIN_
QS. For example, stocks that belong to decile 1 experienced on average a 7.78%
(11.66%) decline in the quoted dollar (proportional) spread whereas the correspond-
ing figure for stocks that belong to decile 10 is 40.68% (44.45%). Similarly, stocks
that belong to decile 1 experienced a 12.93% (16.19%) decline in the effective dollar
(proportional) spread whereas the corresponding figure for stocks that belong to dec-
ile 10 is 50.65% (54.22%). For the quoted depth in dollars (round lots), we find a
3.65% (0.71%) increase (decline) for decile 1 and a 68.10% (70.20%) decline for decile
10. The magnitudes of spread and depth reductions increase almost linearly across
portfolios. Overall, these results are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Earlier we showed (see Section 3.2) that both PQMIN_QS and PQMIN_ES are
positively related to the number of trades and trade size, and negatively to share
7 Because the dependent variables are bound to lie between zero and one, we estimate the model using
Logit regressions. We obtain qualitatively similar results from Probit regressions.
8 We obtain qualitatively identical results when portfolios are formed based on PTMIN_QS. Hence we
report only the results from the PQMIN_QS-based portfolios for brevity.
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Table 4
Changes in the spread and depth and the proportions of one-tick spreads and odd-sixteenth quotes
Deciles 1
(smallest)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(largest)
Panel A: Deciles are based on the proportion of one-tick spreads (PQMIN_QS or PQMIN_ES)
DQuoted spread ($) )0.0778 )0.1601 )0.1828 )0.2215 )0.2238 )0.2613 )0.2709 )0.2863 )0.3149 )0.4068
()5.10)** ()14.08)** ()15.66)** ()23.94)** ()27.10)** ()30.98)** ()30.79)** ()31.66)** ()28.94)** ()39.95)**
DQuoted spread (%) )0.1166 )0.1786 )0.2183 )0.2401 )0.2531 )0.2900 )0.3108 )0.3234 )0.3659 )0.4445
()8.66)** ()14.97)** ()20.09)** ()24.72)** ()29.69)** ()32.78)** ()33.76)** ()34.63)** ()42.02)** ()43.67)**
DEffective spread ($) )0.1293 )0.2366 )0.2753 )0.3320 )0.3468 )0.4079 )0.4210 )0.4251 )0.4350 )0.5065
()8.02)** ()17.60)** ()23.40)** ()32.04)** ()32.64)** ()43.99)** ()48.66)** ()47.89)** ()41.70)** ()53.75)**
DEffective spread (%) )0.1619 )0.2651 )0.3004 )0.3513 )0.3712 )0.4302 )0.4547 )0.4520 )0.4736 )0.5422
()10.83)** ()20.91)** ()26.13)** ()33.36)** ()37.22)** ()47.44)** ()52.14)** ()49.07)** ()54.12)** ()56.94)**
DQuoted depth ($) 0.0365 )0.0934 )0.1639 )0.2536 )0.2888 )0.3486 )0.3974 )0.4379 )0.5113 )0.6810
(1.45) ()3.72)** ()4.54)** ()16.52)** ()19.75)** ()22.99)** ()31.68)** ()30.44)** ()38.72)** ()72.08)**
DQuoted depth (#) )0.0071 )0.1171 )0.2035 )0.2763 )0.3200 )0.3806 )0.4378 )0.4721 )0.5465 )0.7020
()0.30) ()5.00)** ()6.49)** ()20.01)** ()23.39)** ()27.57)** ()42.01)** ()35.60)** ()44.83)** ()78.72)**
Panel B: Deciles are based on the proportion of odd-sixteenth quotes (PODD)
DQuoted spread ($) )0.0859 )0.1375 )0.1810 )0.2273 )0.2175 )0.2717 )0.2855 )0.3113 )0.3419 )0.3465
()5.64)** ()12.25)** ()16.50)** ()22.81)** ()19.20)** ()30.90)** ()34.93)** ()36.48)** ()39.75)** ()30.58)**
DQuoted spread (%) )0.1315 )0.1741 )0.2072 )0.2628 )0.2579 )0.3004 )0.3144 )0.3405 )0.3764 )0.3762
()10.00)** ()14.62)** ()18.36)** ()25.11)** ()26.01)** ()32.76)** ()34.63)** ()40.12)** ()40.57)** ()32.88)**
DEffective spread ($) )0.1329 )0.2297 )0.2819 )0.3411 )0.3504 )0.3939 )0.4217 )0.4438 )0.4777 )0.4423
()8.37)** ()19.38)** ()23.18)** ()32.22)** ()29.43)** ()44.61)** ()41.38)** ()50.44)** ()57.43)** ()37.75)**
DEffective spread (%) )0.1754 )0.2638 )0.3067 )0.3724 )0.3840 )0.4165 )0.4453 )0.4672 )0.5046 )0.4668
()11.93)** ()22.23)** ()25.83)** ()34.98)** ()35.28)** ()44.42)** ()43.22)** ()53.46)** ()58.21)** ()39.96)**
DQuoted depth ($) )0.0278 )0.1563 )0.2010 )0.2183 )0.3145 )0.3663 )0.3977 )0.4732 )0.4864 )0.4976
()1.21) ()8.20)** ()11.47)** ()5.53)** ()20.05)** ()18.63)** ()25.92)** ()41.31)** ()25.34)** ()24.69)**
DQuoted depth (#) )0.0727 )0.1907 )0.2298 )0.2631 )0.3492 )0.3982 )0.4269 )0.4948 )0.5159 )0.5214
()3.25)** ()10.20)** ()13.68)** ()7.68)** ()23.42)** ()23.54)** ()29.70)** ()43.75)** ()28.37)** ()27.06)**
To assess how the relaxation of the binding constraint affected spreads and depth, we first cluster our study sample of 2603 stocks into 10 portfolios according to PQMIN (PQMIN_QS for
the quoted spread and depth and PQMIN_ES for the effective spread). We then calculate the mean percentage changes in the quoted spread, effective spread, and depth within each
portfolio. To assess how the pre-decimalization quote coarseness affected spread and depth changes, we also cluster our study sample into 10 portfolios according to the proportion of odd-
sixteenth quotes (PODD) and calculate mean percentage spread and depth changes within each portfolio. In each cell, we report the mean percentage change in the variable (Dvariable) and
the corresponding t-statistic. Each portfolio contains 260 or 261 stocks.






















































price and return volatility. Hence, the above results suggest that high-volume, low-
risk, or low-price stocks benefited most from decimal pricing.
To assess how the pre-decimalization quote coarseness affected spread and depth
changes, we cluster our study sample into 10 portfolios according to the proportion
of odd-sixteenth quotes (PODD). We then calculate the percentage changes in the
spread and depth within each portfolio. We show the results in Panel B of Table
4. As in Panel A, we find a strong positive correlation between the observed reduc-
tion in the spread and depth and PODD. For example, stocks that belong to decile 1
experienced on average an 8.59% (13.15%) decline in the quoted dollar (propor-
tional) spread whereas the corresponding figure for stocks that belong to decile 10
is 34.65% (37.62%). For the quoted depth in dollars (round lots), we find a 2.78%
(7.27%) decline for decile 1 and a 49.76% (52.14%) decline for decile 10. These results
indicate that stocks with coarser price grids before decimalization experienced smal-
ler declines in the spread and depth after decimal pricing, supporting Hypothesis 2.
4.2. Regression result
Although the previous section shows that the proportions of one-tick spreads and
odd-sixteenth quotes are highly correlated with spread and depth changes, there are
other factors that are likely to have an impact on the spread and depth. It is also pos-
sible that the observed correlations in Table 4 may be spurious. For example, if stocks
with higher quote clustering have wider spreads, the observed correlation between
spread changes and PODD may simply reflect the fact that stocks with larger spreads
before decimal pricing experienced greater reductions in spreads after decimalization.
To examine how the observed changes in the spread and depth can be explained
by the binding constraint and quote clustering after controlling for the effects of
other factors, we estimate the following regression models:










þ a9PQMINi þ a10SPREADi þ a11PODDi þ e1i; ð1Þ












þ b9PQMINi þ b10DEPTHi þ b11PODDi þ e2i; ð2Þ
where DSPREADi and DDEPTHi denote the percentage changes in the spread
and depth, respectively, between the pre- and post-decimalization periods, (post-
value) pre-value)/pre-value; Dk (k ¼ 1; . . . ; 3) is the dummy variable for each deci-
malization pilot; Ak;i (k ¼ 4; . . . ; 8) represents one of the five stock attributes – share
price, the number of trades, trade size, the standard deviation of daily stock returns,
and the market value of equity; PQMINi, SPREADi, DEPTHi, and PODDi are the
pre-decimalization values of the proportion of spreads that are equal to the mini-
mum price variation, the spread, the depth, and the proportion of odd-sixteenth
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quotes, respectively; as and bs are the regression coefficients; and e1i and e2i are the
error terms. We calculate DSPREADi and DDEPTHi using the proportional spread
and dollar depth. Likewise, SPREADi and DEPTHi are the pre-decimal propor-
tional spread and dollar depth, respectively. 9
We include SPREADi and DEPTHi in the model to determine whether stocks
with larger spreads or depths before decimalization experienced greater reductions
in these variables. We include the dummy variables Dk (k ¼ 1; . . . ; 3) in the model
to determine whether decimal pricing exerted different impacts between the first three
pilots and the full implementation group. According to Hypothesis 1, we expect a9
and b9 to be significantly negative. Similarly, we expect a11 and b11 to be negative
according to Hypothesis 2.
We show the regression results in Table 5. The first three columns show the results
when the dependent variable is the change in the quoted spread, the next three col-
umns show the results when the dependent variable is the change in the effective
spread, and the last three columns show the results when the dependent variable is
the change in the quoted depth. For each dependent variable, we report the results
of the three regression models.
The first model uses only the changes in the five stock attributes and three dummy
variables for pilots as the explanatory variables. In this case, the estimates of a0 mea-
sure the changes in the spread and depth that cannot be explained by concurrent
changes in the five stock attributes for the full implementation group of 2466 stocks.
Similarly, a0 þ a1, a0 þ a2, and a0 þ a3 measure the changes in the spread and depth
that cannot be explained by the changes in the stock attributes for decimal pilots 1, 2,
and 3, respectively. Because the majority (94.7%) of our sample stocks belong to the
full implementation group and also because the majority of a1, a2, and a3 estimates
are not significantly different from zero (see below), we focus our discussion on the
results of the full implementation group. 10 In the second model, we add the propor-
tion of spreads that are equal to the minimum price variation in the regression. The
third regression model incorporates two additional variables: the pre-decimal spread
(or depth) and the proportion of odd-sixteenth quotes.
The regression results show that a majority of the estimated coefficients for the
pilot dummy variables are not significant, suggesting that decimal pricing has similar
effects on the spread and depth between the pilots and the full implementation group.
The results of regression model (1) indicate that a significant portion of the cross-sec-
tional variation in spread and depth changes can be explained by the cross-sectional
differences in the changes in stock attributes. For example, these stock attributes (to-
gether with pilot dummies) explain about 26% and 22% of the cross-sectional vari-
ation in the quoted and effective spread changes, respectively.
The results of regression model (2) show that the estimated coefficients for
PQMIN are significant and negative in all three regressions, indicating that stocks
9 The results using the dollar spread and share depth are qualitatively identical to those presented here.
10 The signs and significance of the a1, a2, and a3 estimates tell us whether the effects of decimal pricing
on spreads and depths differ between the full implementation and respective pilot samples.
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Table 5
Determinants of the changes in the spread and depth
Independent variable Change in quoted spread Change in effective spread Change in depth
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept )0.2080 )0.0914 )0.0224 )0.3137 )0.0979 )0.0262 )0.2616 )0.0067 0.0406
()47.29)** ()16.72)** ()1.42) ()63.96)** ()12.33)** ()1.57) ()27.88)** ()0.58) (1.28)
Pilot 1 dummy )0.0635 )0.0918 )0.0858 )0.0450 )0.0832 )0.0707 0.1693 0.1073 0.1147
()1.04) ()1.74) ()1.64) ()0.66) ()1.44) ()1.24) (1.30) (0.96) (1.03)
Pilot 2 dummy 0.0477 0.0670 0.0630 0.0698 0.0797 0.0770 )0.0558 )0.0137 )0.0123
(2.00)* (3.25)** (3.07)** (2.63)** (3.54)** (3.45)** ()1.10) ()0.31) ()0.28)
Pilot 3 dummy 0.0165 0.0325 0.0272 0.0320 0.0460 0.0341 )0.0454 )0.0105 )0.0139
(0.89) (2.02) (1.69) (1.54) (2.61)** (1.95) ()1.14) ()0.31) ()0.41)
DLog(share price) )0.3737 )0.2980 )0.3049 )0.2725 )0.1816 )0.2120 0.1202 0.2855 0.2722
()13.64)** ()12.51)** ()12.57)** ()8.92)** ()6.97)** ()8.04)** (2.06)* (5.67)** (5.37)**
DLog(number of trades) )0.1939 )0.1740 )0.1680 )0.2188 )0.1837 )0.1679 0.0056 0.0492 0.0538
()17.77)** ()18.40)** ()17.12)** ()17.98)** ()17.71)** ()15.71)** (0.24) (2.46)* (2.67)**
DLog(trade size) 0.0227 )0.0368 )0.0398 0.0575 )0.0151 )0.0183 0.4476 0.3176 0.3158
(2.26)* ()4.14)** ()4.49)** (5.15)** ()1.55) ()1.90) (20.95)** (16.90)** (16.78)**
DLog(return volatility) 0.1391 0.1207 0.1183 0.1379 0.1142 0.1089 )0.0038 )0.0440 )0.0497
(19.08)** (19.07)** (18.61)** (16.97)** (16.49)** (15.76)** ()0.25) ()3.29)** ()3.65)**
DLog(market value of equity) )0.0419 )0.0310 )0.0313 )0.0758 )0.0644 )0.0650 )0.0763 )0.0525 )0.0527
()3.38)** ()2.89)** ()2.94)** ()5.49)** ()5.50)** ()5.61)** ()2.89)** ()2.32)* ()2.33)*
Proportion of one-tick spreads
(PQMIN)
– )0.4277 )0.3690 – )0.5379 )0.4329 – )0.9351 )0.8736
()29.67)** ()19.91)** ()31.90)** ()17.85)** ()30.67)** ()21.08)**
SPREAD or DEPTH – – 0.0278 – – 1.0104 – – )1.87· 105
(0.16) (3.52)** ()1.80)
Proportion of odd sixteenths
(PODD)
























































Independent variable Change in quoted spread Change in effective spread Change in depth
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
F -statistic 116.03** 235.89** 193.69** 92.78** 227.87** 195.26** 63.77** 181.72** 149.39**
Adjusted R2 0.2613 0.4483 0.4489 0.2201 0.4397 0.4509 0.1618 0.3846 0.3855
To examine how the observed changes in spreads and depths can be explained by the binding constraint together with these other factors, we estimate the
following regression models:










þ a9PQMINi þ a10SPREADi þ a11PODDi þ e1i;












þ b9PQMINi þ b10DEPTHi þ b11PODDi þ e2i;
where DSPREADi and DDEPTHi denote the percentage change in the spread and depth, respectively, between the pre- and post-decimalization periods, (post-
value)pre-value)/pre-value; Dk (k ¼ 1; . . . ; 3) is the dummy variable for each decimalization pilot; Ak;i (k ¼ 4; . . . ; 8) represents one of the five stock attributes –
share price, the number of trades, trade size, the standard deviation of daily stock returns, and the market value of equity; PQMINi, SPREADi, DEPTHi, and
PODDi are the pre-decimalization values of the proportion of spreads that are equal to the minimum price variation, the spread, the depth, and the proportion
of odd sixteenth quotes, respectively; as and bs are the regression coefficients; and e1i and e2i are the error terms. We calculate DSPREADi and DDEPTHi using
the proportional spread and dollar depth. Likewise, SPREADi and DEPTHi are the pre-decimal proportional spread and dollar depth, respectively. We include
SPREADi and DEPTHi in the model to determine whether stocks with larger spreads or depths before decimalization experienced greater reduction in these
variables. We include the dummy variables Dk (k ¼ 1; . . . ; 3) in the model to determine whether decimal pricing exerted different impacts between the first three
pilots and the full implementation group. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.






















































with higher proportions of one-tick spreads experienced larger reductions in the
quoted and effective spreads as well as in the quoted depth. These results are consis-
tent with our Hypothesis 1. The inclusion of PQMIN alone increased the adjusted R2
value by 18.70%, 21.96%, and 22.28%, respectively, in each of the three regression
models, reflecting the importance of the binding constraint as a possible source of
larger (smaller) spreads and depths before (after) decimal pricing.
The estimated coefficients for the proportion of odd-sixteenth quotes are signifi-
cant and negative in the quoted and effective spread models, respectively, indicating
that stocks with higher proportions of odd-sixteenth quotes experienced larger
reductions in the quoted and effective spreads. 11 The result is in line with Hypothesis
2 and supports the notion that finer price grids, which became available as a result of
decimal pricing, may have a greater front-running effect on stocks whose liquidity
providers (e.g. specialists) did not avoid odd-sixteenth quotes before decimal pric-
ing. 12 The estimated coefficient for the proportion of odd-sixteenth quotes is nega-
tive but not significant in the depth model. Hence, although decimal pricing led to
greater reductions in quote depths for stocks that are likely to have a greater
front-running effect, the results are not as strong as we anticipated. 13
The estimated coefficient for SPREAD in the quoted spread model and the esti-
mated coefficient for DEPTH in the quoted depth model are not statistically signif-
icant, indicating that stocks with larger quoted spreads and depths before decimal
pricing do not exhibit greater reduction in quoted spreads and depths after decimal
pricing. We find however that the estimated coefficient for SPREAD in the effective
spread model is positive and statistically significant, indicating that stocks with lar-
ger effective spreads before decimal pricing experienced smaller reductions in effec-
tive spreads after decimal pricing.
4.3. Sensitivity analysis: Alternative measures of front running and price competition
Although our empirical proxy (PODD) for front running and price competition
has an expected effect on both quoted and effective spreads, PODD is likely to be
an imperfect proxy for the extent of front running and price competition. To assess
11 Because we include the pre-decimalization spread in the regression models, the proportion of odd-
sixteenths is not likely to serve as a proxy for the pre-decimalization spread.
12 This result differs from the finding of Bessembinder (2000) for NASDAQ stocks that a smaller tick
size led to the largest spread reductions for stocks whose market makers avoided odd-eighth quotes.
13 We acknowledge that there are other possible explanations for the reduced depth, e.g. the interaction
of penny pricing and the treatment of limit orders on the NYSE wherein the crowd can participate with a
limit order after the first trade against that limit order. With the $1/8 tick, participation was important
because prices moved relatively slowly. Although limit orders had limited protection depending upon the
dynamics of the crowd, there was at least some protection afforded by the large tick size. With penny
pricing we have seen price changes of well over 100 per minute for actively traded stocks. So the lower
displayed depths result in part to this interaction, as well as to the natural result that follows from the
shape of the supply/demand curves. Thus, with much smaller tick sizes, we can move closer to the
intersection of the supply and demand curves where, by the shape of the curves, smaller quantities are
offered/demanded. We thank the referee for pointing out this point.
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the sensitivity of our results to different empirical proxies, we employ alternative
measures of front running and price competition. Harris and Panchapagesan
(1999) and Ronen and Weaver (2001) suggest that active stocks and higher-price
stocks are expected to experience larger decreases in spreads following the tick size
reduction, especially if the level of price competition among traders is inversely re-
lated to the tick size. To test this conjecture with our data, we replicate Table 5 with
the pre-decimal share price (PRICE) and number of trades (NT) in the regression
models and show the results in Table 6. In regression model (1), we employ PRICE
as our empirical proxy for front running and price competition. Regression model
(2) employs PRICE and NT, while regression model (3) employs all three variables
(PRICE, NT, and PODD) as empirical proxies for front running and price compe-
tition.
Table 6 shows that changes in quoted spreads are negatively related to PRICE,
NT, and PODD, although the coefficient for PRICE becomes insignificant when
the other two variables are also included in the regression. Hence, stocks with higher
activity and/or coarser price grids before decimal pricing experienced larger reduc-
tions in quoted spreads after decimalization. These results are in line with the idea
that decimal pricing exerted a greater impact on price competition and front running
for stocks with more active trading and coarser price grids before decimalization.
Similarly, we find that changes in effective spreads are negatively and significantly
related to PRICE, NT, and PODD. Finally, the results show that decimal pricing
led to larger reductions in quoted depths for more active stocks. Overall, these results
support the view that the effect of the tick size reduction on front running and price
competition is greater for stocks where the competition between specialists and limit
order traders is more intense.
4.4. Intraday variation in spread and depth reductions
In so far as the proportion of one-tick spreads varies across different times of the
day, the spread and depth changes that resulted from decimal pricing are also likely
to vary over time. Thus we anticipate larger reductions in the spread and depth when
the proportion of one-tick spreads was higher before decimal pricing. We partition
each trading day into thirteen 30 minute intervals and calculate the proportion of
one-tick spreads for each stock based on both the quoted and effective spreads dur-
ing each time interval. Similarly, we calculate percentage changes in the spread and
depth during each interval. We then compute the mean values of these variables
across stocks during each 30 minute interval.
Our results show that proportions of one-tick quoted and effective spreads are
smallest during the first 30 minutes and then increase steadily throughout the trad-
ing day. 14 Similarly, we find that percentage declines in the spread and depth are
smallest during the first interval, increase steadily until midday, and then level off
14 For space consideration, we do not report these results here. The detailed results are available from
the authors upon request.
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Table 6
Regression results with alternative measures of front running and price competition
Independent variable Change in quoted spread Change in effective spread Change in depth
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept )0.0708 )0.0758 )0.0145 )0.0702 )0.0811 )0.0218 0.0220 0.0142 0.0400
()8.97)** ()9.67)** ()0.89) ()6.93)** ()8.14)** ()1.27) (1.53) (0.98) (1.24)
Pilot 1 dummy )0.0885 )0.0881 )0.0836 )0.0758 )0.0755 )0.0688 0.1149 0.1152 0.1175
()1.69) ()1.70) ()1.62) ()1.33) ()1.35) ()1.24) (1.03) (1.04) (1.06)
Pilot 2 dummy 0.0762 0.0676 0.0639 0.0938 0.0830 0.0797 0.0035 )0.0071 )0.0086
(3.70)** (3.31)** (3.13)** (4.20)** (3.79)** (3.65)** (0.08) ()0.16) ()0.20)
Pilot 3 dummy 0.0271 0.0253 0.0221 0.0329 0.0311 0.0277 )0.0204 )0.0234 )0.0250
(1.68) (1.58) (1.39) (1.88) (1.82) (1.62) ()0.60) ()0.69) ()0.73)
DLog(share price) )0.3256 )0.3423 )0.3423 )0.2404 )0.2637 )0.2649 0.2318 0.2113 0.2103
()13.18)** ()13.94)** ()13.99)** ()8.98)** ()10.03)** ()10.11)** (4.46)** (4.06)** (4.04)**
DLog(number of trades) )0.1700 )0.1694 )0.1667 )0.1676 )0.1676 )0.1662 0.0586 0.0611 0.0630
()17.36)** ()17.47)** ()17.21)** ()15.72)** ()16.06)** ()15.97)** (2.92)** (3.05)** (3.13)**
DLog(trade size) )0.0358 )0.0339 )0.0364 )0.0148 )0.0132 )0.0147 0.3190 0.3209 0.3197
()4.04)** ()3.86)** ()4.15)** ()1.54) ()1.40) ()1.56) (17.02)** (17.17)** (17.06)**
DLog(return volatility) 0.1208 0.1215 0.1200 0.1114 0.1122 0.1110 )0.0466 )0.0457 )0.0468
(19.02)** (19.32)** (19.12)** (16.17)** (16.62)** (16.49)** ()3.45)** ()3.39)* ()3.45)**
DLog(market value of
equity)
)0.0290 )0.0287 )0.0290 )0.0618 )0.0609 )0.0614 )0.0493 )0.0491 )0.0493
()2.72)** ()2.72)** ()2.76)** ()5.34)** ()5.38)** ()5.44)** ()2.18)* ()2.18)* ()2.19)*
Proportion of one-tick
spreads (PQMIN)
)0.4404 )0.4019 )0.3532 )0.5577 )0.5082 )0.4350 )0.9441 )0.9028 )0.8794
()29.92)** ()26.00)** ()18.48)** ()32.84)** ()29.42)** ()17.93)** ()28.61)** ()26.16)** ()20.33)**
SPREAD or DEPTH )0.1156 )0.2327 )0.3461 0.6036 0.2862 0.1212 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
()0.63) ()1.27) ()1.88) (2.02)* (0.97) (0.41) ()0.89) ()0.53) ()0.64)
Share price (PRICE) )0.0006 )0.0002 )0.0002 )0.0009 )0.0004 )0.0004 )0.0009 )0.0005 )0.0005
()4.70)** ()1.78) ()1.71) ()6.98)** ()3.12)** ()2.91)** ()3.69)** ()1.91) ()1.83)
Number of trades (NT) – )0.0001 )0.0001 – )0.0001 )0.0001 – )0.0001 )0.0001
()7.44)** ()7.16)** ()10.60)** ()10.15)** ()3.99)** ()3.89)**
Proportion of odd
sixteenths (PODD)
























































Independent variable Change in quoted spread Change in effective spread Change in depth
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
F -statistic 196.83** 188.83** 176.91** 197.20** 197.92** 185.32** 150.98** 140.52** 126.76**
Adjusted R2 0.4529 0.4642 0.4678 0.4534 0.4759 0.4794 0.3880 0.3915 0.3915
To examine how the observed changes in spreads and depths can be explained by the binding constraint together with these other factors, we estimate the
following regression models:












þ a9PQMINi þ a10SPREADi þ a11PRICEi þ a12NTi þ a13PODDi þ e1i;












þ b9PQMINi þ b10DEPTHi þ b11PRICEi þ b12NTi þ b13PODDi þ e2i;
where DSPREADi and DDEPTHi denote the percentage change in the spread and depth, respectively, between the pre- and post-decimalization periods, (post-
value)pre-value)/pre-value; Dk (k ¼ 1; . . . ; 3) is the dummy variable for each decimalization pilot; Ak;i (k ¼ 4; . . . ; 8) represents one of the five stock attributes –
share price, the number of trades, trade size, the standard deviation of daily stock returns, and the market value of equity; PQMINi, SPREADi, DEPTHi,
PRICE, NT, and PODDi are the pre-decimalization values of the proportion of spreads that are equal to the minimum price variation, the spread, the depth,
share price, the number of trades, and the proportion of odd sixteenth quotes, respectively; as and bs are the regression coefficients; and e1i and e2i are the error
terms. We calculate DSPREADi and DDEPTHi using the proportional spread and dollar depth. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.






















































thereafter. The smallest spread and depth reductions and the least use of one-tick
spreads near the open suggest that the tick size is least likely to be the binding con-
straint on spread widths during this period and, consequently, the reduced tick size
yields a smaller impact on the spread and depth. This result is consistent with the
well known empirical regularity reported in previous studies that the spread is widest
near the open on the NYSE (see McInish and Wood, 1992; Chung et al., 1999). As
time elapses and the spread narrows, the minimum price variation becomes a binding
constraint more frequently, and thus the reduced tick size exerts a greater impact on
the spread and depth.
5. Is the penny tick size a binding constraint for some stocks?
In light of a recent debate among regulatory authorities and the investment com-
munity on whether decimal pricing provides liquidity suppliers with sufficient free-
dom in the quote-setting process, this section assesses the extent of the binding
constraint under the penny-tick environment. In its response to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)’s Concept Release on Sub-penny Trading, Island –
an ECN currently operating within the NASDAQ market – casts serious doubt on
the adequacy of penny tick increments. 15
Island accounts for more than one of every five trades on NASDAQ and approx-
imately 40% of the orders submitted and 35% of the executions on Island occur in
sub-penny increments. Island currently accepts orders priced out to three decimal
places. 16 Island argues that its continued growth casts significant doubt on the
claims that sub-penny increments would cause investor confusion and harm trans-
parency. Island holds that sub-penny increments provide an opportunity to lower
transaction costs and bring further efficiencies to the market. Island advocates that
the SEC should not only continue to permit sub-penny trading but should also move
forward expeditiously in requiring quotations of at least three decimal places in the
publicly disseminated quotation. In the present section, we shed some light on this
debate by examining whether the penny tick size is a binding constraint on spread
widths using our sample of NYSE stocks.
To assess whether the penny tick size is a binding constraint after full implemen-
tation of decimal pricing, we calculate the proportions of quoted and effective
spreads that are equal to one penny (PQMIN_QS and PQMIN_ES) as well as the
proportion of trading time during which the quoted spread is one penny
(PTMIN_QS). Panel A of Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of these metrics.
15 Source: A letter addressed to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, US Securities and Exchange Commissions by
Cameron Smith, General Counsel, December 18, 2001.
16 ECNs have been offering sub-penny trading even before decimalization. Prior to decimalization,
ECNs traded in increments of 1/256th or $0.0039. In Singapore, small-priced stocks currently trade in ticks
of S$0.005, which is equivalent to US $0.0028. On a 1,000 share order, the third decimal place can be
worth anywhere from $1 to $9. Given that investors change on-line brokers to save a few dollars on a
trade, it is doubtful that $9 is irrelevant to investors.
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Not surprisingly, the mean values (6.98%, 6.73%, and 13.79%) of these variables are
much smaller than the corresponding figures (31.40%, 32.3%, and 44.16%) for the
pre-decimalization study period, indicating that the penny tick is much less a binding
constraint than the $1/16 tick on spread widths. Nevertheless, the results suggest that
Table 7
Determinants of the proportion of one-penny spreads after decimalization
PQMIN_QS PTMIN_QS PQMIN_ES
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Mean 0.0698 0.0673 0.1379
Standard deviation 0.0639 0.0649 0.0898
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1st percentile 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
5th percentile 0.0000 0.0000 0.0120
10th percentile 0.0052 0.0023 0.0262
25th percentile 0.0209 0.0169 0.0662
50th percentile 0.0588 0.0556 0.1350
75th percentile 0.1021 0.1031 0.1979
90th percentile 0.1472 0.1452 0.2471
95th percentile 0.1729 0.1707 0.2800
99th percentile 0.2553 0.2564 0.3796
Maximum 0.7283 0.7589 0.7961
N 2,603 2,603 2,603
Variable
Panel B: Logit regression results
Intercept )7.0516 ()65.43)** )8.2559 ()50.80)** )4.9610 ()61.52)**
Pilot 1 dummy 0.0994 (0.34) 0.0469 (0.11) 0.0869 (0.39)
Pilot 2 dummy 0.4421 (4.13)** 0.4374 (2.71)** 0.1820 (2.28)**
Pilot 3 dummy 0.1169 (1.42) 0.0142 (0.11) )0.0183 ()0.30)
Log(share price) )0.7054 ()25.32)** )0.6758 ()16.09)** )0.5007 ()24.02)**
Log(number of trades) 0.7973 (33.37)** 0.9909 (27.51)** 0.6475 (36.22)**
Log(trade size) )0.0050 ()0.15) )0.0857 ()1.74) )0.1290 ()5.27)**
Log(return volatility) )0.6574 ()25.58)** )0.7518 ()19.40)** )0.4890 ()25.43)**
Log(market value of
equity)
0.0178 (0.87) 0.0114 (0.37) 0.0139 (0.91)
F -statistic 524.36** 352.88** 555.39**
Adjusted R2 0.6301 0.5339 0.6434
We measure the probability that the minimum price variation is a binding constraint on spread widths by
the proportion of quoted spreads that are equal to one cent (PQMIN_QS) during the post-decimalization
study period. To assess the sensitivity of our results to different measurement methods, we also calculate
the proportion of trading time during which the quoted spread is equal to one cent (PTMIN_QS). In
addition, we calculate the proportion of effective spreads that are equal to one tick (PQMIN_ES). Panel A
reports the descriptive statistics of the three measures of the binding constraints. Panel B presents the Logit
regression results showing how these variables are related to stock attributes (share price, number of
trades, trade size, return volatility, and market value of equity). To determine whether the relation between
the proportion of one-tick spreads and stock attributes differs across decimalization implementation
groups, we include three pilot dummy variables in the regressions. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.
* and ** statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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the penny tick may still be a binding constraint for a certain group of stocks. Notice
that about 10% of our study sample (260 stocks) have PQMIN_QS, PQMIN_ES,
and PTMIN_QS values that are greater than 0.14. 17
To determine which stocks are more likely to find the penny tick size a binding
constraint, we regress PQMIN_QS, PTMIN_QS, and PQMIN_ES on a common
set of stock attributes and report the results in Panel B of Table 7. As in Table 3 with
the pre-decimalization data, we find that these variables are significantly and posi-
tively related to the number of trades and trade size, and negatively to share price
and return volatility. These results suggest that sub-penny pricing may further reduce
the spreads of high-volume, low-risk, or low-price stocks.
Although we find some evidence of a penny-tick binding constraint, it is unclear
whether sub-penny pricing would lead to an unambiguous increase in market quality
and investor welfare due to its possible adverse effects. For example, sub-penny
increments may lead to investor confusion, smaller displayed depths due to front
running concerns, higher administrative costs due to multiple executions at multiple
prices for a given trade, and technological backlog. 18 The accurate quantification of
the costs and benefits of sub-penny pricing is likely to be difficult and well beyond the
scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the results of this study should alert regu-
lators and the investment community that the desirability of a further reduction in
tick size deserves careful and full consideration.
6. Summary and concluding remarks
Extant theories put forward several inferences on how decimal pricing may affect
market quality and execution costs. Theory predicts that the smaller tick size lowers
the likelihood that the tick size is the binding constraint on spread widths and thus
reduces the bid–ask spread. The narrower spread in turn leads to a smaller depth be-
cause liquidity providers are less willing to commit large depths when trading profits
are lower. The market depth may further drop because the increased probability of
front running discourages buy-side traders to display their interests. As more traders
are likely to step in front of existing orders due to the lower cost of price improve-
ment, the spread may also further decline. In this study, we provide empirical evi-
dence on how much of the observed changes in the spread and depth after
decimal pricing can be attributed to these different factors.
We show that stocks with higher proportions of one-tick spreads before decimal
pricing experienced larger reductions in the spread and depth. In addition, we find
that stocks with higher proportions of odd-sixteenth quotes and greater trading fre-
quency before decimalization exhibited larger reductions in the spread and depth
17 These stocks are likely to account for a much larger (than 10%) proportion of the total market
trading volume because they are (as shown below) typically large-volume stocks.
18 Some commentators have expressed concerns that sub-penny trading would strain capacity limits of
both market participants and market data vendors.
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after decimal pricing. We interpret these results as evidence that both the relaxation
of the binding constraint and the increased front running and price competition ex-
erted a significant impact on the spread and depth. Our results also indicate that a
significant portion of the observed changes in the spread and depth can be attributed
to the concurrent changes in stock attributes after decimal pricing.
Some caveats are in order. In this study, we measure the binding-constraint and
front-running probabilities by the pre-decimalization proportions of one-tick
spreads and odd-sixteenth quotes (and number of trades), respectively. In so far as
these are imperfect proxies of respective probabilities, our empirical results are open
to alternative interpretations. Our study utilizes trade and quote data during 30 trad-
ing days before and after decimal pricing. Hence, the results of our study do not cap-
ture any long-term effects of decimal pricing. To the extent that market participants
need some adjustment time to fully assimilate themselves to decimal environments,
our results may not capture the full impact of decimal pricing. For example,
although our results suggest that spreads became narrower as a result of the in-
creased front running, they might become wider in the long term if traders reduce
the use of limit orders. Due to limited data availability, our study relied on the
quoted depth only at the inside market. Because decimal pricing can affect the entire
limit order book, a more accurate account of the effect of decimal pricing on liquidity
would require an analysis of how the depth has been affected throughout the limit
order book. Further investigations of these issues may be a fruitful area for future
research.
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